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A Reckless Response to Rape: A Reply
to Ayres and Baker
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan*
In a recent article in the University of Chicago Law Review, Professors
Ian Ayres and Katharine Baker propose the crime of “reckless sexual conduct,”
criminalizing unprotected first-encounter sexual intercourse. The goals of this
proposal are to combat the epidemic of sexually transmitted diseases by
requiring condom use and to reduce acquaintance rape by “forcing”
communication. While the goals are admirable, the proposal is deeply flawed.
As public health legislation, it is overinclusive, thereby punishing the morally
innocent, and its conception of consent as an affirmative defense fundamentally
misunderstands criminal responsibility. As rape reform, which is arguably the
true aim of the statute, the proposal is morally and constitutionally
impermissible: it punishes the innocent and improperly allocates the burden of
proving consent to the defendant. The proposed statute also distracts from rape
reform by attempting to circumvent the critical normative questions about
consent and offering a second-best solution in consent’s place. Finally, the
compromise verdicts that the authors seek, offered as a solution to the “sticky
norms” problem, may ultimately undermine the seriousness of the very rapes
the authors hope to prevent.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................ 639
I. THE PROBLEMS AND THE PROPOSAL .................................................. 641
II. THE PERILS OF THE PROPOSAL ............................................................ 646

*

Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Institute for Law and Philosophy,
Rutgers University, School of Law – Camden. Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
1997-2000. For comments on drafts of this manuscript, I thank Ian Ayres, Katharine Baker,
Michael Dorff, Doug Husak, Jay Feinman, Dennis Patterson, and Ray Solomon. I also
thank my research assistant, Bob Duffield, for invaluable discussions and research
assistance. Contact information: Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Rutgers University, School of
Law – Camden, 217 North Fifth Street, Camden, NJ 08102, kferzan@crab.rutgers.edu.

637

638

University of California, Davis
A.

[Vol. 39:637

The STD Rationale....................................................................... 646
1. This Proposal Is Overinclusive and Punishes Morally
Innocent Conduct................................................................ 647
2. Ayres and Baker’s Proposal Inappropriately
Contains a Consent Defense, Thus Offering a
Conceptually Confused Theory of Excuse ...................... 650
B. As Rape Reform............................................................................ 653
1. The Authors Apply Information-Forcing Default
Rules to the Criminal Law ................................................. 653
2. These Information-Forcing Default Rules Are
Overinclusive and Punish Morally Innocent
Behavior ............................................................................... 654
3. The Authors’ Allocation of the Burden of Proving
Consent to the Defendant Is Morally and
Constitutionally Objectionable.......................................... 657
4. This Proposal May Not Advance, and May
Ultimately Hinder, Rape Reform Efforts ......................... 661
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 665

2006]

A Reckless Response to Rape

639

INTRODUCTION
The rich and famous sometimes get away with murder. And they also
sometimes get away with rape. Rape remains one of the most
challenging areas of criminal law. Defining what constitutes consent and
ascertaining under what conditions consent is competent, knowing, and
unforced present difficult normative questions. And even when a rape,
however defined, occurs, it still remains to be proven. Through the
cracks of doctrinal and evidentiary rules, many rapes go unpunished.
Arguably, Kobe Bryant’s might have been such a case.
There is often an outcry against perceived injustice, and legislation
1
may be introduced in response. In a recent article in the University of
Chicago Law Review, Professors Ian Ayres and Katharine Baker suggest a
new crime to capture Kobe. They propose the crime of reckless sexual
2
conduct.
“Reckless sexual conduct” is, quite simply, unprotected first-encounter
3
intercourse. As Ayres and Baker summarize:
The proposal is simple: a person would be guilty of reckless sexual
conduct and subject to imprisonment up to three months, if, in a
first-time sexual encounter with another specific person, he or she
had sexual intercourse without using a condom. Consent to
unprotected intercourse would be an affirmative defense, to be
established by the defendant by preponderance of the evidence.
The prosecution would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that this was the first time that the defendant had sexual intercourse
4
with the accuser and that no condom was used.

This proposed statute aims to decrease acquaintance rape by creating a
“default rule” of condom usage that will have “information-forcing
5
effects.” The authors contend that the time lapse created by a man

1
For instance, the acquittal of John Hinckley resulted in significant changes to many
jurisdictions’ definitions of insanity. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An
Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 959-60 (1999).
2
Ian Ayres & Katharine Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 599,
599 (2005). The article’s introduction features a hypothetical wherein “Star,” “a married
multimillionaire basketball star” is charged with raping a nineteen-year-old in a Colorado
resort. Id. at 599-601.
3
“The term ‘first-time sexual encounter’ refers to the first time that two particular
people have sexual intercourse. . . . The term is not limited to the first time that an
individual has sex.” Id. at 601.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 631.
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putting on a condom, or getting consent not to do so, presents an
opportunity for the woman to express whether she actually desires
6
intercourse. With more deliberation and communication, the likelihood
7
of acquaintance rape will be reduced. Moreover, in those instances in
which an acquaintance rape still occurs, the separate crime of reckless
sex is intended to offer a new tool for prosecutors: “Reasonable doubts
can remain whether an alleged acquaintance rapist raped, but there is
often no question that he engaged in an unprotected first-time sexual
8
encounter.”
The authors also aim at a second evil: the spread of sexually
9
transmitted diseases (“STDs”). STDs can cause significant harm to those
10
infected and also present a public health problem. Condoms, of course,
11
prevent the spread of these diseases.
This proposal is intended to encompass the conduct of the authors’
12
caricature of Kobe Bryant, whom they refer to as “Star.”
Star, a
married, “multimillionaire basketball star,” is accused of raping a
13
nineteen-year-old at a Colorado resort. Star claims that the two had
vaginal intercourse, but he stopped prior to ejaculation at the woman’s
14
request.
Ayers and Baker contend that, although it will be difficult to prosecute
Star for rape, he is still guilty of other wrongs: “Even if factually
innocent of rape, Star may well be responsible for exacerbating the
epidemic risks of HIV, pelvic inflammatory disease, various forms of
genital cancers, nervous system damage, infertility, high blood pressure,
thromboembolic disease, and something like posttraumatic stress
15
disorder.” “[T]hese risks are routinely inflicted without any criminal

6

Id. at 636 (“[T]he break in the action caused by the attempt to put on a condom will
present an opportunity for the parties (primarily women) to better express whether or not
they truly consent.”).
7
Id.; see also id. at 619-20.
8
Id. at 603.
9
The category of “STDs” encompasses chlamydia, gonorrhea, syphilis, genital herpes,
genital warts, and HIV. Id. at 604-05.
10
Id. at 604-06.
11
Id. at 630-31; see also Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Male Latex
Condoms and Sexually Transmitted Diseases, http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/latex.htm
(last visited Sept. 27, 2005) (stating that condoms prevent spread of STDs).
12
Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 599.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 599, 600 n.3.
15
Id. at 601.
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16

sanction.” The authors intend the crime of “reckless sexual conduct” to
17
fill that gap.
The goals of this proposal are admirable. Given the current risks of
contracting an STD, it is simply foolish to have a one-night stand without
a condom. It is also undoubtedly true that at least some acquaintance
rapes are the result of miscommunication and that most acquaintance
18
rapists currently escape the reach of the law.
The proposal, however, is deeply flawed. As a public health
regulation, this proposed statute is highly problematic.
It is
overinclusive, thereby punishing the morally innocent. Moreover, its
conception of consent as an affirmative defense fundamentally
misunderstands criminal responsibility.
The overinclusiveness of the proposed statute and the inclusion of a
consent defense are completely intelligible, however, when we focus on
the true aim of the proposal. As the introduction focusing on Star
19
evinces, the authors are actually rape reformers. Their approach is
novel — they apply Ayres’s theory of information-forcing default rules
to the criminal law. The authors seek to prevent rape by fostering
communication.
However, as rape legislation, this proposal is morally objectionable
and constitutionally impermissible: it punishes the innocent and
improperly allocates the burden of proving consent to the defendant.
This proposed statute also distracts from true rape reform by offering a
second-best solution. Finally, the compromise verdict the authors seek is
too much of a compromise — the authors offer a lesser alternative to
rape reform, an alternative that may ultimately undermine the
seriousness of the very rapes they seek to prevent.
I.

THE PROBLEMS AND THE PROPOSAL

In their article, Ayres and Baker set forth a formidable argument as to
the evils of STDs and acquaintance rape. They begin with the claim that
20
sex is dangerous. The first danger is STDs, and the statistics they cite

16

Id.
Id.
18
Ayers and Baker cite a Senate Judiciary Committee finding that 98% of rapists are
not caught, tried, and imprisoned. Id. at 637 & n.151.
19
Id. at 599-601.
20
Id. at 603.
17
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are staggering. The authors tell us, inter alia, that fifteen million new
cases of STDs are diagnosed each year, that one in six men aged 15 to 49
has genital herpes, and that 25% of sexually active teenagers have an
21
STD. Women are more susceptible to these diseases, and, with the
exception of HIV, the effects on women are more serious than the effects
22
on men.
We also learn that a small proportion of the population is responsible
for the spread of STDs. While the average individual has seven to nine
partners, a minority of individuals has sex with a significantly greater
23
number of people.
It is this latter group that perpetuates STD
24
infections. It also stands to reason that it is this group that partakes in
25
Hence, Ayres and Baker maintain that
most one-night stands.
enforcing condom usage in first (and likely only) encounters should have
26
a significant effect on the spread of disease.
According to the authors, sex is also dangerous because of its
27
emotional content. Sex is often emotionally laden, but there is even
28
greater emotional destruction associated with rape. Ayres and Baker
claim that the line between rape and sex is all but clear, and they cite one
researcher who contends that misperception is the likely cause of many
29
acquaintance rapes. Acquaintance rapes typically occur in first sexual
30
encounters, and during acquaintance rapes, condoms are rarely used.
The authors conclude that “two attributes of sex — sex that is a firsttime encounter between two particular people, and sex that is
unprotected — when combined are strongly linked to both STDs and
31
acquaintance rape.”
Ayres and Baker aver that both evils may be
prevented through the following statute:
Reckless Sexual Conduct
(1) A person is guilty of reckless sexual conduct when the person
21

Id. at 604.
Id. at 605-06.
23
Id. at 607.
24
Id. at 611 (“For example, if everyone had exactly eight sexual partners during the
course of his or her lifetime . . . most STDs would cease to exist.”).
25
Id. at 612.
26
Id. at 617.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 618.
29
Id. at 619.
30
Id. at 620.
31
Id. at 622.
22
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intentionally engages in unprotected sexual activity with another
person who is not his or her spouse and these two people had not
on an occasion previous to the occasion of the crime engaged in
sexual activity.
(2) Affirmative Defense: Notwithstanding Subsection (1), it shall be
an affirmative defense to any action brought under this article that
the person, with whom the defendant had unprotected sex,
expressly asked to engage in unprotected sexual activity or
otherwise gave unequivocal indications of affirmatively consenting
to engage in sexual activity that is specifically unprotected.
(3) Definitions:
(a) “Sexual activity” means penile penetration of a vagina or
anus accomplished by a male or female.
(b) “Unprotected sexual activity” means sexual activity without
the use of a condom.
(c) “Occasion of the crime” includes the twelve-hour period
after the two people engage in sexual activity for the first time.
(4) Sanctions:
(a) Sentence: The crime of reckless sexual conduct is punishable
in the state prison for three months, or a fine.
(b) Sexual Offender Status: The court shall not register a person
as a sexual offender because the person was found guilty of
32
reckless sexual conduct.

The authors explain that this proposal, although innovative, is
consistent with existing law. First-encounter sex is currently treated
with greater suspicion than later encounters, as evidenced by rape
spousal immunity provisions and by the admission of prior sexual
33
behavior between the victim and the accused. Additionally, statutes
and case law already address the relevance of condom use to the
34
presence or absence of consent.
Ayres and Baker also note that the legal landscape already contains
32

Id. at 632-34.
Id. at 622-24.
34
Id. at 626-27 (citing cases finding that request to use condom is insufficient to prove
consent to intercourse, but is sufficient to prove lack of consent to unprotected intercourse).
33
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complementary statutes.
The Model Penal Code bars reckless
35
endangerment.
California criminalizes unprotected sexual activity
where the individual knows he has HIV, fails to disclose it, and acts with
36
the specific intent to infect his partner. Missouri, on the other hand,
requires the actor to disclose his HIV status regardless of whether he
37
uses a condom.
However, the authors contend the legal landscape is incomplete. For
example, in Missouri, an infected individual is not immunized by using
a condom, and thus, the state’s statute provides no incentive for condom
38
use.
Moreover, endangerment prosecutions have focused almost
39
exclusively on HIV. Finally, the authors argue that no statute exists to
40
protect victims from the emotional havoc created by nonconsensual sex.
In the third part of their paper, Ayres and Baker contend their
proposed statute would abate these evils. They employ three different
frameworks — the rational-actor, behaviorist, and social norms
approaches — to demonstrate how their proposed statute would work.
Rational actors would use condoms not only because they fear false
complaints but also as the result of the communication that a default
41
condom rule would engender.
From a behaviorist perspective, the
proposed law would fight against availability bias and optimism, both of
which may cause individuals to underestimate the risks of STDs and
42
acquaintance rape. Finally, because most people already use condoms
43
in first-time encounters, the proposed statute would reinforce the
existing social norm while giving men an independent reason to reach
for a condom without this action being perceived as an admission of
44
infection.
Ayres and Baker also claim that justice would be served more often
under their statute.
Currently, most acquaintance rapists go

35
36

Id. at 627-28; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 211 (1962).
Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 628; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120290 (West

2005).
37

Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 628; see MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 2002).
Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 628-29.
39
Id. at 629.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 635-37.
42
Id. at 647-50. “Availability bias refers to people’s tendency to appreciate and
internalize only those risks that are obvious — or readily cognitively available.” Id. at 648
n.182.
43
Id. at 650-51.
44
Id. at 651-52.
38
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45

unpunished. Ayres and Baker argue that if their statute were enacted,
acquaintance rapists might very well be convicted, as it would be easy
for prosecutors to establish that the act was a first encounter and that it
46
was unprotected. Moreover, Ayres and Baker believe that jurors would
be willing to convict those whom they do not believe are “real rapists”
47
because the punishment is not severe. Shifting the burden of proving
consent to the defendant would also increase convictions, and although
it would also increase the risk of punishing the innocent, Ayres and
Baker dismiss this concern because “[c]urrent research suggests that the
propensity of women to make false reports of acquaintance rape is
48
extremely low.” Men, they argue, can escape punishment simply by
49
wearing a condom.
In the fourth part of their paper, Ayres and Baker address the
constitutionality of their proposed statute. First, they argue that public
policy supports placing the burden of proving consent on the defendant.
Favorable aspects of their proposal from a public policy perspective
include increasing the likelihood of crime reporting, offsetting the
difficulty of proving nonconsent, and coinciding with the common sense
view that no woman would willingly and recklessly put her health at
50
risk. Second, the authors contend the allocation passes constitutional
51
muster. Ayres and Baker argue that their proposed statute addresses a
crime different from rape because their goal, unlike that of rape statutes,
52
is to criminalize unprotected sex. Indeed, the authors assert that the
affirmative defense could be altogether abolished and the proposed
53
statute would remain justified “for public health reasons.”
At one
point, they go so far as to argue that “nonconsensual sex is not the target

45

Id. at 637.
Id. at 638.
47
Id. at 656; see also SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 3-4 (1987) (noting often made, but
inappropriate, distinction between acquaintance rape (“simple rape”) and stranger rape
(“real rape”)).
48
Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 639.
49
Id. at 640 (“From an ex ante perspective, they hold the keys to their own jail house.”).
The authors also address the possibility that their proposal immunizes rapists so long as
they wear a condom. However, they dismiss this possibility not only because it is unlikely
in stranger rape cases but also because “it would be hard to imagine a regime with a lower
probability of punishments” for current acquaintance rapes. Id. at 640-42.
50
Id. at 658-59.
51
They also argue that the statute does not unduly burden privacy and freedom of
association. Id. at 661-64.
52
Id. at 660.
53
Id.
46
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54

of our statute.” Ultimately, the authors claim that the rationale for the
affirmative defense is the mitigation of the defendant’s culpability
because his partner “actively solicited” the unprotected sex, thus
“parallel[ing] the affirmative defenses of entrapment and irresistible
55
impulse.”
Thus, Ayres and Baker present a seemingly comprehensive argument
in support of the separate crime of reckless sex. Requiring men to wear a
condom (or to get consent not to do so) can reduce the evils of STDS and
56
acquaintance rape.
II.

THE PERILS OF THE PROPOSAL

Despite the legitimacy of its aims, this proposal should never become
law. As STD legislation, it is morally illegitimate and its consent defense
is conceptually confused. It is only when we view the proposal through
the prism of rape reform that we can begin to understand the contours of
this proposed statute. Yet, even as rape reform, the proposal threatens to
punish the innocent and to undermine the seriousness of acquaintance
rape.
A.

The STD Rationale

The first goal of the proposal is to minimize STDs. I argue in this
section that, with regard to this rationale, the statute is problematic in

54

Id. at 661.
Id. at 660-61.
56
The authors’ discussion primarily depicts male defendants and female victims. I
follow their usage. Under the authors’ proposed statute, women will be largely immune
from prosecution when a man does not use a condom because, as the authors state, the
“man’s choice to place his unsheathed penis inside the woman in most cases would
provide an unequivocal indication [of his consent].” Id. at 642. The authors claim this de
facto asymmetry is justified because the vast majority of acquaintance rapists are male,
women are more likely to be injured by STD transmission, and the authors want to
encourage rape reporting. Id. at 644.
One analytical gap is worth mentioning here. The authors’ statistics reveal that
homosexual men engage in the most one-night stands. Id. at 614. Indeed, the authors draw
the reader’s attention to this fact and then discuss the constitutionality of the
disproportionate burden their legislation will have on gay men. Id. at 615, 663. One thus
may question whether the proposed statute aims at the same set of relationships — the
authors believe that gay men will be affected by the STD aspect of the legislation and that
heterosexual men will be affected by the acquaintance rape aspect of the legislation. Thus,
the male perpetrator/female victim dichotomy does not depict the true state of affairs, at
least with respect to the STD rationale.
55
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two respects. First, it is overinclusive, thereby threatening to punish the
morally innocent. Second, the statute is underinclusive in a manner that
undermines criminal responsibility — it offers a conceptually confused
theory of excuse.
1.

This Proposal Is Overinclusive and Punishes Morally Innocent
Conduct

The proposed statute is overinclusive. As Ayers and Baker note,
statutes already exist that criminalize an infected individual’s failure to
57
disclose that he has an STD. There is, however, a critical distinction
between statutes such as Missouri’s and California’s and that of the
authors. In the former statutes, the defendant (1) actually has the STD
and (2) culpably risks transmitting the disease. In contrast, under the
authors’ proposal, even a defendant who knows that he does not have an
STD can be guilty of reckless sexual conduct. This, of course, is a
significant difference.
Indeed, it is only in a footnote that the authors address their statute’s
overinclusive nature:
To the extent our statute regulates unprotected sex that could not
pose a public health threat (between two people who knew they
were not STD carriers), our statute imposes an unnecessary health
regulation . . . . This class of cases is so minute and the cost of
compliance is so small (get consent or use a condom) that we think
it extraordinarily unlikely that it could be seen to violate
constitutional guarantees of due process. Overinclusive criminal
58
statutes are not forbidden by the Constitution.

The authors are correct in their contention that “[o]verinclusive
59
criminal statutes are not forbidden by the Constitution.” The Supreme
60
Court has had little to say about substantive criminal law. Criminal
statutes, unless burdening a fundamental right, are subject only to
61
rational basis review. Thus, as one commentator has noted, a state

57

Id. at 627-28.
Id. at 661 n.235.
59
Id.
60
Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 509, 509 (2004) (“It has become a commonplace that there are no meaningful
constitutional constraints on substantive criminal law.”).
61
Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the
Criminal Sanction, 23 LAW & PHIL. 437, 465-66 (2004).
58
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could constitutionally criminalize eating sausage to prevent obesity.

Academics have long argued that the Supreme Court’s rational basis
standard is an inadequate standard of review for criminal statutes. The
state should have a good reason to coerce citizens into acting or not
63
acting in a specific manner. Criminal legislation that is overinclusive is
morally illegitimate in that it criminalizes conduct that is not wrongful
64
and thus is not appropriately the subject of regulation. In such cases,
the state threatens to punish an individual for conduct that she should be
at liberty to engage in. When the individual breaks such a law, despite
engaging in morally innocent behavior, that person is incarcerated — a
65
significant deprivation of liberty.
As Professor Sherry Colb has argued, “liberty from confinement
cannot be relegated to the status of unprotected aspects of daily life,
66
subject to any regulation that is not utterly irrational.” In illustrating
what would be objectionable overinclusive legislation, Colb imagines “a
statute that provides for the incarceration of those engaging in
premarital sex to further the compelling interest in public health by
67
shielding citizens from deadly diseases.”
There is little difference
between Colb’s hypothetical law and that proposed by Ayres and Baker.
Colb’s law might punish more innocent people, but it, too, meets rational
basis review, the only standard that Ayres and Baker believe to be
relevant.
Here, Ayres and Baker’s proposal threatens to take away an
individual’s liberty when he actually presents no risk of the harms the
proposed statute seeks to prevent. Their criminal net encompasses

62
Id. at 467; see also William J. Stunz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 507 (2001) (“It has long been a source of academic complaint; indeed, it has
long been the starting point for virtually all the scholarship in this field, which . . .
consistently argues that existing criminal liability rules are too broad and ought to be
narrowed.”).
63
JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 9 (1984)
(“Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justification.”).
64
See also Douglas N. Husak, Reasonable Risk Creation and Overinclusive Legislation, 1
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 599, 605 (1998) (“[T]he sentiment that underlies the presumption of
innocence seems applicable to a defendant whose act-token violates an overinclusive
statute, even though it is reasonable and thus should not have been criminalized in the first
place.”).
65
See Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different from All
Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 821 (1994).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 828.
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everyone from eighteen-year-old virgins to promiscuous twenty-sevenyear-olds, from those who see doctors to those who do not. However, if
neither individual has an STD, they simply present no risk of
contributing to STD epidemics. In such cases, the state does not have
any good reason to restrict their behavior in any manner, no matter how
slight the coercion is.
In addition, to the extent that the authors might justify punishing this
morally innocent behavior for deterrence reasons (e.g., to encourage
condom use by others), this rationale is particularly troublesome.
Empirical data indicate that changes in criminal law rules have little
68
deterrent effect.
Thus, the innocent are essentially sacrificed for no
purpose whatsoever. Moreover, the criminal justice system operates best
when it reflects the community’s views of desert, and deviations from
desert — punishing innocent people — can ultimately undermine the
69
moral force of the criminal law.
The proposed statute should be restructured to eliminate this injustice.
Three different types of situations may be legitimately criminalized.
First, if an actor acts purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly as to
transmitting the disease, is an STD carrier, and actually infects another
person, his conduct should be criminalized. Second, if an actor acts
purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly as to transmitting the disease, is
an STD carrier, but does not infect his partner, his conduct, too, could be
covered. This type of conduct would be analogous to an attempt.
Finally, the proposed statute could cover the situation wherein the
defendant does not have the disease but still culpably risks infecting
others. To illustrate, an individual who has had fifty unprotected
encounters may have been fortunate enough to avoid an STD, but he
may still be quite cognizant of the risk that he is a carrier. If he fails to
68
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 204 (2004) (“[T]he standard practice of
formulating criminal law liability and punishment rules to optimize deterrent effect is
indefensible given the rarity with which such rule formulation is likely to have the
intended effect on crime decisions.”). I thank Doug Husak for this point.
69
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 49798 (1997) (“Most importantly, it is clear that a utilitarian calculus in determining the rules
for the distribution of criminal liability and punishment must take account of real-world
costs that come from deviating from the community’s principles of deserved punishment.
The costs and benefits of moral credibility may be more difficult to measure than those of
the factors typically taken into account by utilitarian calculations in the past, but if they are
more powerful in their effect than the other factors, to ignore them risks rendering the
calculation meaningless.”).
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confirm his noninfected status and willingly puts his future partners at
risk, the proposed statute should cover his conduct. While punishing
those who present no real risk of infection might be controversial, this
approach would still be narrower than the authors’ proposal, as it would
not encompass morally innocent behavior.
In each of the situations presented above, there is a reason to
criminalize the actor’s behavior. Each individual acts culpably because
he has expressed his willingness to harm another. Hence, the state may
legitimately criminalize such behavior.
2.

Ayres and Baker’s Proposal Inappropriately Contains a Consent
Defense, Thus Offering a Conceptually Confused Theory of
Excuse

The proposed statute thus revised still needs significant work,
however, because it is also underinclusive, and it is underinclusive in a
particularly problematic way. The authors seek to legitimize placing the
burden of proving consent on the defendant by arguing that the statute
70
is a public health regulation.
According to Ayres and Baker, the
consent defense is analogous to the defenses of entrapment or irresistible
71
impulse.
They claim that men are less culpable when they are
encouraged or seduced to “behave recklessly with regard to the spread
72
of STDs.” This excuse theory of consent offers an inappropriate defense
to the guilty and presents a conceptually confused view of criminal
responsibility.
Consent cannot operate as an excuse. If this proposed statute aims at
the public welfare, then the defendant’s culpability is in no way
mitigated simply because he acts on a desire to have unprotected
intercourse and his partner is a willing, and perhaps encouraging,
participant. Many, many factors influence people to commit crimes.
They are often seduced or enticed. This does not excuse the actors,

70
Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 643 n.166 (“From the perspective of acquaintance
rape, it is obviously relevant to a defendant’s culpability whether or not the woman
consented. But, . . . the affirmative defense is constitutional only if it does not represent an
essential element of the crime. Accordingly, we explicitly want to ground the defense as a
way of mitigating the culpability of acting recklessly with regard to the social risk of
STDs.”).
71
Id. at 643-44; id. at 661 (“[O]ur affirmative defense parallels the affirmative defenses
of entrapment and irresistible impulse — defenses that qualify society’s condemnation of
the defendant’s state of mind.”).
72
Id. at 643-44.
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73

however. “Causation is not compulsion”; otherwise, responsibility
74
would vanish. It is only when the defendant lacks the capacity or the
fair opportunity to refrain from criminal conduct that we are willing to
75
excuse him from criminal responsibility.
Accordingly, the two defenses to which the authors seek to analogize
their consent defense, irresistible impulse and entrapment, are simply
inapposite. Irresistible impulse is an insanity test, wherein the defendant
76
lacks volitional control. That is not the case here. No matter how
desirable his partner is, the man retains control over his participation in
intercourse and the use of a condom. Encouragement and enticement do
not compel him to commit the criminal act.
77
Entrapment, in turn, is best viewed as a nonexculpatory defense,
resting on the public policy rationale that “the judicial process ought not
to be sullied by the use of improper police misconduct to procure
78
convictions.” Entrapment cannot be understood to reflect the view that
encouragement itself excuses, because the defense does not apply
79
generally, but only to conduct by police officers. Thus, neither of these
defenses provides any support for the claim that encouragement excuses.
Indeed, criminal law tells us just the opposite:
the woman’s
encouragement establishes her complicity — it does not excuse the
80
man.
73

MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 526 (1997).
Id. at 522-47 (arguing that causation does not excuse); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and
the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 350 (1998)
(defining “the ‘fundamental psycholegal error’: Causation is neither an excuse per se nor
the equivalent of compulsion, which is an excusing condition.”).
75
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 17.03[E] (3d ed. 2001)
(discussing personhood theory, which requires that we “excuse people whose ability to
reason practically is grossly disturbed or underdeveloped (e.g., insane people and infants) .
. . [and] those whose opportunity to reason practically is seriously undermined on an
individual occasion (e.g., due to passion or coercion)”); PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 83 (1997) (“[T]he actor can point to abnormal circumstances or
abnormal characteristics that make it too difficult for the actor to appreciate the criminality
or wrongfulness of his or her conduct or too difficult to conform his or her conduct to the
requirements of law.”).
76
DRESSLER, supra note 75, § 25.04[C][2].
77
2 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 209(b), at 513-16 (1984).
78
Id. § 209(b), at 513; see also Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 845-57 (2004) (explaining why individual’s culpability is not
diminished when he is entrapped).
79
ROBINSON, supra note 77, at 515.
80
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(i) (1962) (solicitation establishes accomplice
liability); id. § 5.02(1) (defining solicitation as, among other things, “encouragement”). See
generally Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of
74
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Moreover, from the standpoint of the public health rationale, there is
simply no reason to excuse the defendant simply because the victim
81
consented to the unprotected intercourse. If this statute were designed
to protect the woman, consent would be relevant because it would
82
negate the wrongfulness of the action. However, as a public health
regulation, the harm extends beyond the two participants. In such cases,
the consent of the woman is insufficient to address the evil sought to be
83
prevented.
Indeed, consider the authors’ claim that Star’s conduct increased the
risk of harms to multiple persons because he “did not know whether the
nineteen-year-old was infected with a sexually transmitted disease,” thus
increasing “the chance that both he and any other individuals with
whom he would subsequently engage sexually (including his wife)
Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 333 (1985) (explaining that rationale behind complicity
doctrine is that accomplice cannot be said to “cause” principal’s actions). Kadish states:
That same view of human action that entails freedom to choose obviously
applies to the actions of one who is responding to the actions of another. In the
same sense and for the same reasons that a person’s genes, upbringing, and
social surroundings are not seen as the cause of his actions, neither are the
actions of another seen as the cause of his actions. We regard a person’s acts as
the products of his choice, not as an inevitable, natural result of a chain of events.
Therefore, antecedent events do not cause a person to act in the same way that
they cause things to happen, and neither do the antecedent acts of others. To
treat the acts of others as causing a person’s actions (in the physical sense of
cause) would be inconsistent with the premise on which we hold a person
responsible.
Id.
81

Eliminating the affirmative defense of consent would not “thereby transform[] the
crime into a strict liability offense,” as the authors claim it would. Ayers & Baker, supra
note 2, at 643; see also id. at 660 (“[A] strict liability offense, which would remove consent
from the analysis completely, could readily be justified as necessary for public health
reasons.”).
Ayers and Baker’s proposed statute might itself be viewed as imposing some type of
formal or substantive strict liability: the defendant must intend intercourse, but no mens
rea is required as to whether the defendant is infected, and the defendant need not even be
infected. This has nothing to do with consent. Consent is not relevant to (1) the defendant’s
mental state regarding whether he is infected or (2) whether the defendant actually is
infected. Thus, while allowing consent as a defense will undoubtedly reduce the number
of people who fall within the proposed statute’s proscriptions, the defense achieves this
goal by relying on an arbitrary and irrelevant fact. The authors might as well allow “being
a brunette” to be an affirmative defense — such a defense would be equally (un)intelligible.
82
In such a case, however, it would be unconstitutional to allocate the burden of
proving consent to the defendant. See infra text accompanying notes 107-15.
83
PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF
CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 114-19 (2004) (explaining why consent does
not apply to offenses that cause harm to people beyond participants).
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84

would become infected.”
Nothing in the authors’ proposed statute
would solve this problem. Infected risk-takers who choose to engage in
reckless sex with consenting partners are immune from prosecution for
the reckless act, despite the fact that they increase the risk to third parties
(including their wives). And these actors are immune from liability in
subsequent encounters with their wives because those acts would not be
first encounters. Thus, consent as an affirmative defense undermines the
proposed statute’s effectiveness.
To the extent that the proposal aims at reducing the spread of STDs, it
misses the mark. While the goal is admirable, Ayers and Baker risk
punishing the innocent. The authors also disregard the effect that their
affirmative defense of consent would have — it would free the guilty.
The proposed statute must be restructured so as to eliminate these
effects.
B.

As Rape Reform

The problems with Ayers and Baker’s proposed statute as STD
legislation may ultimately be beside the point. The true target of this
proposal is acquaintance rape. Understood from this perspective, the
proposed statute need not be limited to infected individuals and the
85
defense of consent is relevant. Through the prism of rape reform, the
pieces of this proposal come together.
Unfortunately, even as rape legislation, the proposal is unsound. In
this section, I explain how the proposal seeks to establish penalty
86
defaults so as to “force” individuals to communicate about consent.
Next, I claim that the authors’ default rule punishes the innocent. I
further argue that this statute is unconstitutional and morally
objectionable because it places the burden of proving consent on the
defendant. Finally, I turn to the practical problems with this proposal.
First, I argue that it amounts to a second-best proxy for consent that
avoids the true debates we must have about rape law. Second, I argue
that the compromise verdicts sought by the authors could reinforce
existing views that acquaintance rape is not “real rape.”

84

Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 601 n.8.
See Id. at 661 n.235 (noting that when two individuals are not STD carriers in “this
small group of people . . . the statute might be seen as regulating the same thing as rape
statutes because the only reason to require such couples to use protection is to protect
against nonconsensual sex”).
86
Id. at 631.
85
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The Authors Apply Information-Forcing Default Rules to the
Criminal Law

In a 1989 article, Professor Ayres and his co-author Professor Robert
Gertner famously introduced the concept of “penalty defaults” to
87
contract law. At that time, when faced with an incomplete contract,
commentators urged courts to set default rules according to what the
88
parties would have wanted. Ayres and Gertner, however, argued for
penalty defaults that are set “at what the parties would not want — in
order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to
89
third parties.” “Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one party
to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and
90
therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.”
Ayres and Baker expand the usage of these default rules to the law of
91
rape.
The authors create an incentive for the man to ask the right
questions. If a man needs to reach for a condom, there will be a pause in
the sexual activity that will give both parties an opportunity to
communicate about consent. If the man asks the woman for permission
to forego using a condom, there will likewise be an opportunity for
communication. But if the man simply proceeds with intercourse
without stopping for a condom or obtaining articulated consent, the
penalty default kicks in.
He has forgone the opportunity for
communication and is guilty of reckless sexual conduct. Thus, the
proposed statute, “though not as explicit in its communication forcing as
those rules that require verbal consent before initiating a move to a
higher level of sexual intimacy, would likely have comparable
92
information-forcing effects.”

87
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
88
Id. at 89.
89
Id. at 91.
90
Id.
91
Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 631; cf. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law:
Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 37475 (2004) (offering thought experiment of information-forcing adultery statute, but
ultimately concluding it was inappropriate to employ such default rules in criminal law
context).
92
Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 631.
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These Information-Forcing Default Rules Are Overinclusive and
Punish Morally Innocent Behavior

With the structure of this legal rule articulated, the inquiry turns to
whether the proposed penalty default can be justified. In order to make
this evaluation, it is important to clearly articulate the harm or evil that
the proposed statute seeks to prevent. The authors claim that Star and
other actors have engaged in behavior that falls within “the moral
93
category of reckless sexual conduct.” However, once we unpack this
category, it is evident that the proposed statute does not punish a
different harm, a different culpability level, or a different moral category
94
than do those statutes that punish acquaintance rape.
First, there is no additional harm at issue besides the harm presented
by rape. The authors seem to believe that rape laws fail to criminalize
the emotional impact of rape:
The failure of the law to address emotional injuries associated with
nonconsensual sex is a serious problem because, as mentioned,
physical injury is often not the gravamen of the harm in rape. If the
essential harm of rape can be an emotional harm, it would make
sense to penalize its reckless infliction.
Our proposed
95
criminalization of reckless sexual conduct is tailored to do just that.

At another point they argue that, “save rape, there is no regulation of the
reckless infliction of the emotional harm that can flow from careless
96
sexual behavior.”
97
While it may be difficult to articulate the exact harm of rape, there is
no doubt that the current rape laws address the harms listed above.
98
Rape is both a physical and emotional injury, and it is exactly these
93

Id. at 656.
Despite forsaking the rape rationale at one point, the authors clearly target
acquaintance rape. E.g., id. at 636 (predicting that their statute would make “clear progress
in the fight against acquaintance rape”); id. at 638 (“[T]he criminalization of reckless sexual
conduct is likely to reduce the problem of acquaintance rapists going completely
unpunished.”); id. at 665 (“Because so many acquaintance rapes are first-time sexual
encounters, and because so many of those rapes are primarily caused by a lack of
communication, a law that fosters communication in first time sexual encounters will likely
be very effective at reducing the incidence of acquaintance rape. Our proposal is such a
law.”).
95
Id. at 629.
96
Id. at 664.
97
For an excellent discussion, see ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS
89-118 (2003).
98
See ESTRICH, supra note 47, at 103-04 (“Whether one adheres to the ‘rape as sex’
94
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99

harms that rape laws deter and punish.
Second, the authors are not getting at a different type of culpability.
They aim at recklessness:
In emphasizing that acquaintance rapists are “real rapists,” the [rape
reform] movement has had the effect of erasing the moral category
of reckless sexual conduct. Under their approach, a man is either a
“rapist” or legally not culpable. Our statute imposes a less severe
punishment precisely because what we are attacking directly is
100
recklessness, not the result of recklessness.

According to Ayres and Baker, an actor is reckless when he does not
take the time to inquire as to whether the woman is actually
101
consenting. That is, Ayres and Baker’s complaint is that a man either
consciously disregards the substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
woman may not be consenting or he is unreasonably unaware of that
risk. These formulations, of course, are the very definitions of
102
recklessness and negligence, and these culpability levels already exist
in rape statutes. Many states convict the man when he is simply
negligent as to the victim’s lack of consent, and some states arguably
103
have strict liability as to this provision. Thus, there is no doubt that the
law currently punishes the reckless actor. Indeed, in instances in which
the woman consents but the man believes he is raping her, the man is
104
still within the reach of the criminal law through attempt provisions.
Admittedly, recklessness as to consent is not always sufficient for
school or the ‘rape as violence’ school, the fact remains that what makes rape, whether
‘simple’ or ‘aggravated,’ different from other crimes is that rape is a sexual violation — a
violation of the most personal, most intimate, and most offensive kind.”).
99
To the extent that the authors might reply that acquaintance rape without a condom
is a greater harm, minor reforms of rape laws would address this problem. The situation is
analogous to killing someone with one shot versus a machete. The use of a machete is not
its own crime, but aggravates the murder. Once again, the authors are not truly addressing
a new harm.
100
Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 656.
101
Id. at 602 (“Men who rape recklessly, by not finding the time or compassion to
discern a partner’s consent, rarely find time to use a condom.”); id. at 620 (“The
miscommunication, or lack of communication, that characterizes many acquaintance rapes
can often be traced to recklessness. Recklessness can lead a man to complete the sexual act
heedless of the consequences.”).
102
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962).
103
DRESSLER, supra note 75, § 33.05 (noting that in several jurisdictions, honest and
reasonable mistake as to consent is not defense). But cf. WESTEN, supra note 83, at 143-44
(arguing commentators rely on dicta when claiming strict liability is imposed).
104
WESTEN, supra note 83, at 148-52 (when victim consents but defendant believes she
does not, defendant has attempted rape).
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liability because many rape laws require the element of force.
My
argument is not that recklessness is sufficient to convict under current
law, but that the authors’ target is the wrong of rape and the culpability
of acquaintance rapists. Thus, this proposed statute stands or falls on an
acquaintance rape rationale — there is no separate moral category here
and no separate wrong or culpability level at issue.
In other words, the separate crime of reckless sexual conduct is
justified only to the extent that it covers the recklessness of acquaintance
rapists or targets the harm inherent in rape. There is no other
justification. Unfortunately, the statute fails to meet this burden because
the failure to wear a condom is not coextensive with the crime of
acquaintance rape. A man can act recklessly as to the woman’s consent
but still wear a condom, and a man may not be reckless as to consent,
even if he does not wear a condom. In the latter instance, this proposed
statute would punish morally innocent behavior.
Once again, the purpose of this proposed statute is to prevent the
harm of rape. The culpability at issue is the recklessness of a man in
failing to ascertain whether the woman is consenting. Thus, there is
simply no justification for subjecting a man to even one day in jail simply
because he did not wear a condom while having consensual sexual
intercourse. Certainly, the man may be profoundly foolish for not
wearing a condom, but this law is not designed to protect the man from
himself — it is designed to protect the woman from rape.
While this statute will create an incentive to communicate, creating
incentives is not the purpose of the criminal law. In the criminal law, a
“penalty” default requires a justification for that “penalty.” Failing to
communicate about the use of a condom is not coextensive with being an
acquaintance rapist, and Ayers and Baker offer no other justification for
punishing the failure to communicate. Retributivists will find punishing
the innocent to be wholly unjustified, and even utilitarians should fear
that deviations from desert undermine the moral force of the criminal

105
E.g., People v. Warren, 446 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that because
defendant did not use weapon or otherwise directly threaten to harm victim, there was no
rape); Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1164-65 (Pa. 1994) (reading
Pennsylvania rape statute as requiring force, not just nonconsensual sex). See generally
ESTRICH, supra note 47, at 58-71 (describing how rape reform legislation shifted focus from
nonconsent to force in effort to draw focus toward man’s behavior and away from
woman’s lack of resistance and how this reform has ultimately failed); WESTEN, supra note
83, at 208 (describing how “force”/“consent” formulation debate rests on false conceptual
premises because both concepts are capable of incorporating same type of wrongful
pressures). I thank Professors Ayres and Baker for prompting me to clarify this point.
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106

law.
3.

The Authors’ Allocation of the Burden of Proving Consent to the
Defendant Is Morally and Constitutionally Objectionable

This proposed statute suffers from a second fatal flaw: the allocation
of the burden of proving consent to the defendant is morally and
107
constitutionally objectionable. The authors concede that allocating the
burden of proving consent to the defendant would be unconstitutional if
108
the aim of their statute was to decrease acquaintance rapes.
Indeed,
the constitutional impediment is the reason why the authors seek to
legitimize the allocation under the public health rationale:
From the perspective of acquaintance rape, it is obviously relevant
to a defendant’s culpability whether or not the woman consented.
But, as argued in Part IV.A, the affirmative defense is constitutional
only if it does not represent an essential element of the crime.
Accordingly, we explicitly want to ground the defense as a way of
mitigating the culpability of acting recklessly with regard to the
109
social risk of STDs.

As discussed previously in Part II.A.2, the attempt to tie the consent
defense to STDs fails because there is no reason to provide a consent
defense for a public health regulation. Indeed, the theory behind a
“consent as excuse” defense is so conceptually confused that the only
legitimate explanation for the consent defense is that it applies to the
rape rationale.
Once consent is properly understood as applying to the rape rationale,
it is constitutionally and morally impermissible to allocate the burden to
110
the defendant. Consent possesses “moral magic”: it “turns a trespass
into a dinner party; a battery into a handshake; a theft into a gift; an
invasion of privacy into an intimate moment; a commercial

106

See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
Ayres and Baker claim that the state of Washington allocates the burden of proving
“forcible compulsion” to the prosecution, but allocates the burden of proving consent to the
defendant. Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 659 n.226. This is also true of the District of
Columbia. See Russell v. United States, 698 A.2d 1007, 1116 n.12 (D.C. 1997). However,
because “force” negates legal consent, the result is that juries are given contradictory
instructions. WESTEN, supra note 83, at 129 n.1.
108
Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 643 n.166.
109
Id.
110
Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 121 (1996).
107
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appropriation of name and likeness into a biography.”
Consent can
112
thus “make an action right when it would otherwise be wrong.” When
a “victim” consents, there is no wrong and, thus, it is morally illegitimate
to place the burden of proving consent on the defendant. The
prosecution must prove there was a rape, or an act of reckless sex, and if
the victim consented, there simply was no such act.
Ayers and Baker’s proposal also violates the Due Process Clause.
113
Dating back to In re Winship, it has been clear that the prosecution
bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt “every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is
114
charged.” When there is sex with consent, there is no rape and, thus,
no crime. Consent renders the conduct completely permissible. Because
lack of consent is the very circumstance that renders the conduct
criminal, the burden of proving this element must lie with the
115
prosecution.
While the authors concede that under the rape rationale, placing the
burden of proving consent on the defendant would run afoul of the
Constitution, it is worth exploring the implications of their inappropriate
116
allocation.
Consider two claims Ayers and Baker make. First, they
state that their proposed statute will reduce acquaintance rapes because
“it will be fairly easy to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sex
was unprotected and that it was a first-time sexual encounter. . . .
Therefore the criminalization of reckless sexual conduct is likely to

111

Id. at 123.
Id.
113
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
114
Id. at 364.
115
It is true that the Supreme Court’s formalism in this area is problematic, as the
question of what constitutes an essential element depends upon the legislature’s
formulation of the crime. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 223 (1977) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (“The test the Court today establishes allows a legislature to shift, virtually at
will, the burden of persuasion with respect to any factor in a criminal case, so long as it is
careful not to mention the nonexistence of that factor in the statutory language that defines
the crime.”); Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CAL. L. REV. 335,
341 (2000) (“Something peculiar is at work, however, when the extent of a constitutional
guarantee that ought to limit the reach of the criminal sanction is determined by the
legislation establishing the sanction itself.”). Still, academics have a luxury that legislators
do not have. Legislators must respond to political pressures, pressures that may
sometimes yield less than optimal criminal statutes. There is simply no reason, however,
why thoughtful academics cannot draft proposed statutes that present a coherent view of
the harm sought to be prevented and properly allocate the burden of proof on those issues.
116
Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 643 n.166.
112
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reduce the problem of acquaintance rapists going completely
117
unpunished.”
Of course it will.
The primary problem with
acquaintance rape prosecutions, as evidenced by the Star hypothetical
with which the authors begin, is the question of consent. Consent is
crucial because it tells us whether the act is rape or sex. Certainly, if we
eliminate the pivotal element of rape from the prosecutor’s burden of
proof, we will get more rape convictions. The problem is that some of
those convicted might be factually innocent of the crime.
The authors are not all that concerned with punishing the innocent.
Their second claim is that the conventional wisdom reveals that in only
118
2% of cases do women falsely accuse men.
This proportion is
119
Thus, the authors tell us
comparable to that of other major crimes.
false convictions will not be likely even when the burden of proving
consent is allocated to the defendant — the risk of error is the same as
with any other crime. There is a critical distinction, however. With other
major crimes, the prosecution bears the burden of proving every
essential element. Hence, even if a defendant is falsely accused, Winship
protects him from being falsely convicted. Here, if the proposal allows
the prosecution to avoid proving the key element of acquaintance rape,
there will certainly be significant instances of punishing the innocent.
Winship provides a key protection against the punishment of the
innocent, and it is that protection the authors seek to circumvent.
Additionally, the authors cannot defend their allocation of the burden
of proving consent by reconceptualizing the problem and claiming that
120
their proposal punishes recklessness, not the result of recklessness.
Admittedly, the defendant may still be culpable in those instances in
which the victim consents but the defendant is unaware of this fact. In
such cases, although the wrong of rape has not occurred, the defendant
has consciously disregarded the risk that the victim is not consenting.
121
He is still culpable. In such cases, the defendant has attempted rape.
Importantly, in such instances, where the defendant proceeds in
conscious disregard of the possibility that the victim does not consent,

117

Id. at 638.
Id. at 639.
119
Id.
120
See id. at 656; E-mail from Katharine Baker, Professor of Law and Associate Dean,
Chicago-Kent College of Law, to author (Feb. 1, 2005, 16:49:26 CST) (on file with author).
121
See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(a) (1962) (stating that person is guilty of
attempt when he “purposefully engages in conduct that would constitute the crime if the
attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be”).
118
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consent is necessarily unavailable as a defense. Indeed, it is the very
presence of consent that prevents the behavior from constituting rape
itself (as opposed to attempted rape). Thus, no consent defense should
be available at all, and to offer a defense in such a case would
122
fundamentally misunderstand the workings of the offense.
Ultimately, the relevance of the consent defense turns on the rationale
for the proposed statute. If the proposed statute is a public health
regulation, then, as mentioned previously, a consent defense is
inappropriate. If the proposed statute seeks to punish the actor’s
recklessness, irrespective of the victim’s consent, then the consent
defense is likewise inappropriate. Only if the proposed statute aims at
the wrong of rape is consent relevant, and in that instance, because
consent negates the wrongfulness of the action, the burden of proof
properly rests on the prosecution.
4.

This Proposal May Not Advance, and May Ultimately Hinder,
Rape Reform Efforts

Finally, even if the authors could restructure their proposed statute to
avoid these constitutional and moral impediments, we must consider
whether any separate crime of “reckless sexual conduct” will actually
advance rape reform. There are reasons to doubt whether this law
would be efficacious, and more troubling yet, there is reason to believe
that this statute might undermine rape laws.
First, Ayres and Baker obscure the real questions in rape law. They
seek to offer a proxy for consent. Under their proposal, we need not
inquire into consent for acquaintance rape — we force the information
by requiring the use of a condom. But this evades the critical question:
when may a man permissibly have intercourse with a woman? Does
“no” mean no? Or does only “yes” mean yes? These are the debates that
we need to have. “Do I need a condom?” is not the question. Nor will it
give us the right answers. In 1991, a Ponoma College male sophomore
123
asked a female freshman: “Should I get a condom?” She said: “no.”
The man understood her to be saying “no” to the condom, and the
122

An instance of nonconsent by the victim and recklessness on the part of the
defendant would obtain if the man attempted to rape the woman. Reckless sexual conduct
cannot be understood as this type of attempt. By definition, reckless sexual conduct
requires the sexual act and an unprotected one at that.
123
WESTEN, supra note 83, at 81; see Susan Estrich, This Case Demeans Real Date Rape
Victims, USA TODAY, May 26, 1994, at A15 (stating that man said “I should get a condom”
and that woman “‘motioned’ no, by saying uh-uh and shaking her head”).
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woman meant “no” to the sex. “Should I get a condom?” does not solve
the consent problem; it simply creates another layer of confusion.
The crime of reckless sexual conduct does not even offer a full proxy
for consent because the statute likewise allows a consent defense. The
authors define consent as “expressly ask[ing] to engage in unprotected
sexual activity or otherwise [giving] unequivocal indications of
affirmatively consenting to engage in sexual activity that is specifically
124
unprotected.”
If the defendant has an STD and does not reveal this
when he solicits his partner’s consent to unprotected intercourse, is her
consent valid?
The same questions regarding the knowledge
125
requirements for valid consent reappear.
In other respects, however, this proposed statute does what rape laws
do not always do: it defines what actions are necessary for consent.
While many jurisdictions define consent with reference to the victim’s
state of mind, this proposal’s requirement of an affirmative act may
126
minimize mistakes. The irony here is two-fold. First, if states were to
adopt this definition of consent for their rape statutes, then the separate
crime of reckless sex would be unnecessary. Second, to the extent that
states do not define consent in this manner for rape laws, there is no
reason for them to adopt a different definition of consent for this crime.
Thus, this proposed statute only works if states employ two conflicting
conceptions of consent while seeking to prevent the very same harm.
The final efficacy problem is, simply put, alcohol. Drunk people are
not rational actors, they have a very specific cognitive impairment, and
they often flout social norms. One of the most difficult practical
problems with acquaintance rape is the presence of alcohol and its effects
on communication and perception. Nowhere in the authors’ proposal do
they come to terms with the diminished effect that their proposal will
127
have on the behavior of those under the influence.
124

Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 632.
Cf. Regina v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371 (“Without disclosure of HIV status there
can be no true consent. The consent cannot be simply to have sexual intercourse. Rather, it
must be to have intercourse with a partner who is HIV-positive.”).
126
Defining consent as an expressive act is not without its problems, however.
“Indeed, th[e] practice of defining consent in rape cases as a mental state on a subject’s part
while requiring mens rea on the actor’s part is, if anything, a more precise measure of an
actor’s guilty mind . . . .” WESTEN, supra note 83, at 145. Notably, the authors’ proposal
does not have a mens rea requirement. While the Model Penal Code’s default mens rea
would be recklessness, one suspects that the authors would rather impose negligence or
even strict liability. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1962) (setting forth default mens rea
of recklessness).
127
Of course, one can make a broader attack on the rational-actor model. Unprotected
125
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Thus, this legislation distracts from rape reform. It avoids the
questions we should be asking and instead settles for a second-best
solution. The authors offer us another layer of complexity — another
layer of consent — without resolving the current problems. We still do
not know what the victim must know or what she must say or what in
the world we are to do about intoxicated consent. The authors’ secondbest solution thus distracts from rape reform while presenting us with
the very same unanswered questions.
The efficacy problem does not end here, however. This proposed
statute may not just distract from rape reform. It may undermine it.
The authors claim that juries will convict actors such as Star, because
even if the jurors do not perceive Star to be a “real rapist,” they will be
128
willing to find him guilty of reckless sex.
“Reasonable doubts can
remain whether an alleged acquaintance rapist raped, but there is often
129
no question that he engaged in unprotected, first-encounter sex.” They
believe that “the criminalization of reckless sexual conduct is likely to
130
decrease the overall ‘errors’ in the criminal justice system.” This crime
“creates the first practicable means of obtaining a conviction — albeit for
131
a crime with a modest sanction.”
Introducing this “crime with a modest sanction” is offered as a
132
solution to the “sticky norms” problem.
Professor Dan Kahan argues
that the sticky norms problem “occurs when the prevalence of a social
norm makes decisionmakers reluctant to carry out a law intended to

sex currently carries the risk of HIV, genital warts, genital herpes, gonorrhea, chlamydia,
and syphilis, not to mention the risk of creating another human life. Yet people still have
unprotected sex. If, in the movie Alfie, the title character — a paradigmatic disease “node”
— does not care that having sex with his best friend’s girlfriend/fiancée can give him a
disease, impregnate her, and ruin his friendship, why would Alfie fear a three-month jail
term? ALFIE (Paramount Pictures 2004).
128
Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 603 (“The crime of reckless sexual conduct will also
be a powerful prosecutorial tool for the thousands of acquaintance rape cases that are
simply not winnable under current law. It represents a way to partially overcome the ‘he
said/she said’ dilemma. A prosecutor who does not have enough objective evidence to go
forward with a rape case could easily have enough objective evidence to prove reckless
sexual conduct.”); id. at 656 (“Decisionmakers may be willing to ruin the life of a ‘real
rapist,’ but they will not impose comparable punishment for what they see as a less severe
crime. The crime of reckless sexual conduct will make it easier to punish callous sexual
behavior precisely because the punishment will not ruin the defendants’ lives.”).
129
Id. at 603.
130
Id. at 637.
131
Id. at 638.
132
See id. at 654-58.
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133

change that norm.”
When legislation overreaches by punishing
severely (“hard shoves”), prosecutors are less likely to prosecute and
juries are less likely to convict, thus potentially causing the contested
134
norm to grow in strength. Kahan argues that “gentle nudges,” crimes
with modest sanctions, may be more effective at changing the contested
135
norm. Ayres and Baker intend their proposed statute to be just such a
136
gentle nudge.
When defendants are charged with both acquaintance rape and
reckless sexual conduct, the authors may very well get the compromise
verdicts they seek. Behavioral psychology reveals that jurors may seek
this third alternative. The “compromise effect” predicts that when jurors
137
are offered a middle alternative, they will choose it.
Ayres and Baker
would call this result a success because more rapists will be convicted of
something, and any innocents caught in the web will only go to jail for a
short period of time and only because they foolishly failed to wear a
138
condom.
The obvious problem with the proposed statute is its potential to
punish the innocent. This concern warrants repeating. Ayres and Baker
brush this fear aside by claiming that the defendant “hold[s] the keys to
139
[his] own jailhouse” by determining whether to wear a condom. Yet,
what the statute effectively does is to restrict the liberty of an individual
despite the fact that he presents no risk of harm. We all hold the key to
our own jail cells. We can prevent false accusations against ourselves by
staying home, never driving a car, and never speaking to other human
beings. But our liberty interests consist not only in liberties from but also
133
Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000).
134
Id. at 609 (“If the law condemns too severely — if it tries to break the grip of the
contested norm (and the will of its supporters) with a ‘hard shove’ — it will likely prove a
dead letter and could even backfire.”).
135
Id. at 610-11 (“If the lawmaker selects a sufficiently mild degree of severity . . . then a
majority of decisionmakers will enforce the law at the outset. This condition, too, will
reinforce itself. As members of society are exposed to consistent and conspicuous instances
of enforcement, they will revise upward their judgment of the degree of condemnation
warranted by the conduct in question. Accordingly, over time, the percentage of
decisionmakers willing to enforce the existing law will grow . . . .”).
136
Id. at 654-58.
137
See generally Neil Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social
Perceptions of Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 211 (1972).
138
Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 640 (“Switching from a regime with very large and
unavoidable Type I errors [failing to punish the guilty] to one with small but avoidable
Type II errors [punishing the innocent] is a tradeoff that society should embrace.”).
139
Id.

2006]

A Reckless Response to Rape

665

in liberties to, and it is this latter liberty that the state must have a good
140
reason to restrict. A man who has consensual sex and does not have an
STD should not have his liberty restricted under this proposed statute.
Moreover, if falsely accused, he certainly should not have to fear a
compromise, or more aptly, a compromised, verdict.
An equally destructive problem, however, is the punishment of the
guilty. Is any amount of justice better than no justice? Maybe not. We
simply should not be satisfied that a rapist is sentenced to three months
in jail for reckless sex when he deserves many years for rape. While
appeasing the victim should not be the goal of the criminal law, the
problem with this proposed statute can be revealed by one simple
question: will any victim feel that her rapist was caught, tried, and
convicted for the tremendous evil that was done to her if the rapist gets
three months in jail for reckless sex? Will not the convictions for this
crime undermine the very seriousness of acquaintance rapes? In Kahan’s
terminology, we must be wary that this legislation is not a gentle nudge,
141
but rather a “sly wink” that reinforces the existing norm.
The authors deny this possibility. They claim that their statute is a
142
supplement to, and not a substitute for, acquaintance rape statutes.
They seek to analogize their statute to a DUI law, reasoning that “[i]f
most people do not conflate a DUI conviction with a manslaughter
conviction, people need not conflate a conviction for reckless sex with a
143
rape conviction.”
The analogy fails. Lawmakers did not enact DUI
laws because prosecutors were failing to pursue manslaughter cases or
because juries were not convicting. Rather, DUI laws criminalize an
inchoate act — by driving intoxicated, one takes the risk that one might
kill another person. In contrast, reckless sexual conduct cannot be an
inchoate form of acquaintance rape because both crimes require the very
140

See FEINBERG, supra note 63, at 7-10 (discussing idea of “liberty-limiting principle”).
Kahan, supra note 133, at 624 (“[I]t is also possible that ‘indecent assault’ statutes,
too, will end up reinforcing the ‘no sometimes means yes’ norm. Critics argue that these
statutes, precisely because they grade nonforcible, nonconsensual sex so much less severely
than rape, are likely to corroborate the conviction that such behavior is not really worthy of
criminal punishment at all. This anxiety points up a general implementation problem for
the ‘gentle nudges’ strategy. That strategy implies that lawmakers should favor less
condemnatory policies over more condemnatory ones in order to avoid triggering the ‘hard
shove’ dynamic. But policies that are only weakly condemnatory can be seen as signaling
that the underlying conduct isn’t genuinely worthy of condemnation, an inference that is
likely to reinforce itself insofar as moral appraisals are shaped by social influence.”).
142
Ayers & Baker, supra note 2, at 655 (“Reckless sexual conduct should not be
presented as a substitute for rape.”).
143
Id.
141
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same sexual act.
The authors want to eat their cake and have it too. They want to claim
that this statute is necessary to convict acquaintance rapists and still
144
claim that it punishes a “separate” crime of reckless sex.
But this
separate crime is not separate at all. Its aim is to offer a lesser alternative
to a rape conviction in the hopes that the jury will convict.
Ultimately, what effect convictions for reckless sexual conduct will
have on our perception of acquaintance rape is an empirical question.
The problem is that we cannot afford a failed experiment. Date rape has
entered the public consciousness. It is the subject of everything from
freshman dorm meetings to afternoon soap operas. While criminalizing
“reckless sexual conduct” might unstick the norm, it could have the
opposite effect, an effect that could undermine this progress.
CONCLUSION
In their conclusion, Ayers and Baker note that some readers may
believe they have created a “thaumatrope,” “which by blending these
two policy objectives somehow tricks the reader into seeing a whole that
145
is greater than its parts.”
I believe that the authors have missed the
force of the objection. It is not simply the case that Ayres and Baker have
created a spinning toy that, through an optical illusion, combines a
picture of a bird and a picture of a cage into a single image — a bird in a
cage. The optical illusion here is far more troubling: they seek to
combine two incomplete images and pretend they have a coherent
whole, when what they actually have is just two images with a lot of
holes. They seek to show us a picture of a bird without wings, spin the
toy and show us wings, and pretend their image can fly. It cannot.
The most incoherent aspect of the authors’ proposal is their view of
consent. The authors offer it as an affirmative defense, and they place
the burden of proving consent on the defendant. Of course, as described
above, such an action will have a significant impact on acquaintance
rape. Because the contested issue in acquaintance rape prosecutions is
consent, placing the burden on the defendant will ensure a greater
number of convictions. But, as seen above, and as the authors note, there
is a significant problem with such an allocation — it is unconstitutional.

144
Compare id. at 638 (“[T]he criminalization of reckless sexual conduct is likely to
reduce the problem of acquaintance rapists going completely unpunished.”), with id. at 660
(“The crime of reckless sexual conduct is not about punishing nonconsensual sex . . . .”).
145
Id. at 665.
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To fill this gap, the authors offer their second rationale: public health.
If consent is a defense to the public health rationale, then the authors
claim that they can justify allocating the burden to the defendant. The
problem, however, is that with regard to this rationale, they cannot
justify having a consent defense at all. If a woman consents to the risk of
being infected, she increases the risk that others will become infected in
the future. Her consent is utterly irrelevant to the health of the public.
In fact, she increases the chance of potential harm.
The woman’s consent also does not in any way diminish the man’s
culpability. One may not risk hurting other people for consensual sex.
Here, if consent is a defense to the public health rationale under an
entrapment or irresistible impulse analogy, the offer of consensual
unprotected sex is an excuse to the risking harm of harm to others. The
criminal law has never recognized such a defense nor should it.
In summary, consent has no place in this proposal if the aim is to
protect the public health. Consent is properly part of a rape statute (or
any other proposal aimed at protecting the woman), but the burden
there must lie with the prosecution. The middle ground struck by the
authors — offering consent as an affirmative defense that the defendant
must prove — does not resolve either problem. It is both conceptually
confused and constitutionally unsound. This bird cannot fly.
With the best of intentions, Ayres and Baker propose the crime of
reckless sexual conduct to address the ills of STDs and acquaintance
rape. Both goals, however, cannot be achieved with this one proposed
statute, and with respect to both aims, the proposal requires significant
reform. The STD legislation is overbroad and thus criminalizes morally
innocent behavior, a result that is not only contrary to the presumption
of liberty in a free society but also may undermine the moral force of the
criminal law. Additionally, by offering a defense when conduct is
consensual, the proposal excuses the morally guilty and legislates a view
of excuse that runs contrary to our bedrock assumptions about criminal
responsibility. Punishing the innocent and excusing the guilty are
socially destructive actions, and the authors proceed with too little
caution.
The authors’ attempt at rape reform is also problematic. Once again,
the proposed statute criminalizes innocent behavior, and worse still, it
unconstitutionally places the burden of proving an essential element on
the defendant. Moreover, even the punishment of the guilty is
problematic under this proposed statute. The proposal offers a poor
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proxy to real rape reform and ignores the fact that those culpable
individuals who truly are acquaintance rapists deserve significant
punishment, not a mere three months in jail. Slight punishments may
gradually affect the norm so that our society becomes more willing to
punish acquaintance rape, but such punishments may also reinforce the
view that acquaintance rapes are not real rapes. Thus, with no empirical
data suggesting that the chance of the former effect outweighs the
danger of the latter, it is simply imprudent to proceed. This is the time
for rape reform. But we should not be reckless about it.

